Analysis of the Barsebaeck nuclear power plant Risk and consequence scenarios for the worst possible accident at the Barsebäck nuclear power plant: version 1, paper of August 31th 2003

Press release from Barsebäcksoffensiv (BBOFF) September 1^st 2003 on the Danish Minister of the Interior’s answers in the Danish Parliament to questions about the Danish nuclear rescue preparedness

Background of the press release: End of May 2003 Keld Albrechtsen from Enhedslisten and Pernille Blach Hansen from the Social Democrats put forward four questions to the Danish Minister of the Interior, Lars Løkke Rasmussen. The Minister’s written answers were made by the Danish Emergency Management Agency that is responsible for the management of the consequences in Denmark of an accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant. The questions were triggered by an article in the daily MetroXpress Monday the 20^th of May that described, how the consequences of a terrorist attack against the Barsebäck nuclear power plant were downplayed by the Danish authorities after the attack against World Trade Centre September 11^th 2001. According to the article, the Swedish Ministry of Defence had established as early as 1987 that the population would have to be evacuated at a distance of 60 kilometres in the direction of the wind, if radioactive substances were released from the Barsebäck nuclear power plant. This scenario was contrary to a memorandum that the Danish Emergency Management Agency published after the attack against the World Trade Centre. However, the Minister of the Interior saw no reason to doubt the Danish consequence scenarios or question the Danish Emergency Management Agency’s handling of the nuclear rescue preparedness.

As regards this topic BBOFF has published a paper, ”Risk and consequence scenarios for the worst possible accident in the Barsebäck nuclear plant” which can be downloaded here in a Danish and English draft version

In the paper BBOFF concludes that the Danish Emergency Management Agency estimates of a serious accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant are still being downplayed. This is especially the case when the agency claims that the consequence scenarios that are the basis of the Danish nuclear rescue preparedness are “in accordance with international practices for radiation protection”, i.e. primarily the lessons learned from the Chernobyl disaster.

In the paper BBOFF points out that all new information on the Chernobyl disaster indicates that the consequences of a serious nuclear accident are far more serious than the Danish Emergency Management Agency presupposes in its calculations of the consequences of the worst possible accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant.

In the paper BBOFF compares the release of radioactive substances from Chernobyl with the release in a worst-case scenario for the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, basing its assessments on international reports and the U.N. Chernobyl-website. After consultations with World Information Service in Paris, BBOFF concludes that under all circumstances and especially regarding the possible release of caesium-137 it is possible to draw the conclusion that the worst-case scenario for a serious accident in the Barsebäck 2 reactor could be comparable to the Chernobyl disaster. In this context it is worth noting that the scenario for the rest risk release described in the 1995 Report from the Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI) and The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI), which the Danish Emergency Management Agency claims the Danish nuclear rescue preparedness plan is based on, is comparable to the actual Chernobyl release scenarios, even though the Agency says otherwise.

As a consequence of the Chernobyl accident all people within a radius of 30 kilometres around the Chernobyl reactor were evacuated from their homes. The area has been declared an exclusion zone, where no one is allowed to live. An exclusion zone within a radius of 30 kilometres around the Barsebäck nuclear power plant would in Sweden include Malmö, Lund, Landskrona, Eslöv, Staffanstorp and at least twenty villages and in Denmark all of Amager, Copenhagen City, Frederiksberg, Vesterbro, Nørrebro, Østerbro, Vanløse, Brønshøj, Valby, Vigerslev, Hvidovre, Avedøre Holme, Brøndbyøster, Rødovre, Utterslev, Nordhavn, Bispebjerg, Hellerup, Husum, Mørkhøj, Gladsaxe, Søborg, Buddinge, Bagsværd, Vangede, Gentofte, Charlottenlund, Skovshoved, Jægersborg, Ordrup, Lyngby, Sorgenfri, Virum, Klampenborg, Tårbæk, Rådvad, Søllerød, Holte, Gl. Holte, Øverød, Nærum, Trørød, Skodsborg, Vedbæk, Sandbjerg, Isterød, Ravnsbjerg, Høsterkøb, Brådebæk, Hørsholm, Usserød, Vallerød, Rungsted and Kokkedal. In this context it is worth noting that one of the directors of SKI recently has confirmed that the Swedish authorities consider an exclusion zone 100 kilometres in the direction of the wind realistic and that the 1995 Report from SSI and SKI has confirmed worst-case scenarios implicating exclusion zones of 20, 50, 60 and 100 kilometres from the release source, depending on the weather conditions.

Consequently, the concept of the 30 kilometres exclusion zone is conservative compared to some of the Swedish authorities’ own scenarios. This zone is actually very small compared to the large distances covered by some of the most important radionuclides from the Chernobyl accident. In the case of an accident with a large release of the same order as in Chernobyl, but to a smaller height above the plant, a 30 kilometres exclusion zone around the Barsebäck nuclear power plant could actually be more contaminated than the exclusion zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

Just like the exclusion zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is a historical fact, it is a fact that the three countries on which the disaster has inflicted the greatest losses – Ukraine, Belarus and Russia – have lost 2889 billion DKK. This cost is spread over time: It started on the day of the accident and amounts to that total now, but the concerned states are not done with it. The affected populations still suffer from the consequences, hence the cost is still there and it will go on for decades. So far, this amount is more than twice the total Danish BNP for 2002. Contrary to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant that is situated in a thinly populated agricultural area, the Barsebäck nuclear power plant is situated in the most densely populated area in Scandinavia, less than 30 kilometres from the largest city in Denmark and the third largest city in Sweden. The Danish capital is inhabited with more than 660.000 people. Therefore it is likely that far more than the 350.000 people who were evacuated or resettled after the Chernobyl disaster would have to be evacuated or resettled in Denmark in case of the worst possible accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant. It is also likely that the Danish economic losses would be much higher than the 2889 billion DKK the Chernobyl disaster so far has cost the three former Soviet republics. The metropolitan area is the economically most productive area in Denmark. As an indication hereof, the 2001 BNP per capita in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg was 397.000 DKK compared with an average for the whole country of 247.000 DKK per capita, i.e. almost 16 times higher than the 2000 BNP per capita in Ukraine and 8 times higher than the 2000 BNP per capita in Belarus.

Consequently, considering

-that the Barsebäck nuclear power plant is situated only 20 kilometres from the centre of Copenhagen and at the same time statistically can be considered the most dangerous nuclear power station in Sweden according to the International Nuclear Event Scale

-that SKI recently has requested a criminal investigation into the management Barsebäck 2 because of alleged violation of safety standards at the plant. This is the first time the inspectorate has made such a request as regards a nuclear power plant in Sweden.

-that SKI is being investigated itself by the public prosecutor because of negligence regarding the same matter. For many years nuclear skeptics have considered SKI responsible for the numerous unchallenged violations of the Act on Nuclear Activities, thus legalizing a company culture in the Swedish nuclear power plants that has made possible the many anomalies and incidents.

-that the Swedish government five times has promised that the Barsebäck nuclear power plant will be decommissioned and every time broken this promise

• that it is still uncertain when Barsebäck 2 will be shut down and that one could argue that the likelihood that the reactor will be decommissioned is dwindling as time passes by, because of the growing popular support for nuclear power in Sweden
• that the Danish government supports a policy of political and administrative openness

BBOFF proposes, that the Danish government increases its pressure on the Swedish government in order to get the Barsebäck nuclear power plant decommissioned  and at the same time as quickly as possible

• initiates an independent investigation of the Danish nuclear rescue preparedness – preferably with the involvement of one or more independent international research agencies
• initiates an independent investigation of what the consequences of the worst possible accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant would be for the environment, public health and the economy in Denmark.

This investigation should be based on the newest international findings in this field and should try to reach a clarification of

• the short-term and long-term effects of such an accident on the environment and public health, including its influence on the frequency of thyroid cancer, leukaemia, other cancer diseases and diseases in general among children and adults, its influence on pregnancy and on the new generations and not least its psychological effects.
• the risk dimension, including the extent of the service duty for the personnel expected to carry out the sanitation in Denmark after the worst possible accident in the Barsebäck nuclear power plant. To throw light on this problem is highly relevant considering that the number of casualties among the 800.000 mitigators of the consequences of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is estimated to be between 25.000 and 100.000 and considering that 92 % of the 336.000 mitigators in Ukraine have officially been recognized sick.
• the direct losses from the accident - expenditure on decontamination work in the affected territories, emergency aid and medical help to the affected population, research of the environment, public health and production of non-contaminated foodstuffs, organizing the monitoring of the radioactive situation, radiation-ecological improvements of residential areas and radioactive waste management, resettlements of the most affected parts of the population and improvements in their living conditions – and the indirect losses - long-term production loss caused by loss of arable land and forests, shutting down of agricultural production facilities and industrial facilities and loss of profit opportunities.

In this context is has to be taken into consideration that the economic damage done to the Danish society if literally hundreds of thousands of citizens will have to give up their residences, while at the same time hundreds of thousands of jobs are lost, will not be compensated in full by Vattenfall AB and Sydkraft AB that own the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, or by the Swedish state. It is also worth noting that according to the Swedish nuclear liability act, the operator might be exonerated wholly or partially if a person suffering damage has contributed hereto due to gross negligence on his part. This could pertain to the Danish Emergency Management Agency, if a Swedish court deems the Danish nuclear rescue preparedness insufficient. People in Denmark who suffer personal injury because they were not evacuated in time would have to bring actions against the Danish Ministry of the Interior instead.

Just as striking as the fact that neither the operator of the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, nor the Swedish state are liable for nuclear damage deriving from a terrorist attack on the plant, is the fact that nuclear damage in Denmark corresponding with the one described above will practically not be compensated. As part of the privileges that the Swedish government has granted the nuclear industry, the maximum limit of the insurance policies of the Swedish energy companies is 2,67 billion DKK (3,3 billion SEK). The Swedish state itself will cover nuclear damage that the operator does not compensate due to the above-mentioned ceiling, though not more than with 4,86 billion DKK (6 billion SEK). Although the owners of Barsebäck are the Swedish state itself, the largest energy company in Sweden (Vattenfall AB), the largest energy company in Southern Sweden (Sydkraft AB) that for its part is owned by the world’s largest private energy company (E.ON.) and the Norwegian state, nuclear damage in Denmark as described above will only be compensated in the order of magnitude of a quarter of a per cent (a calculated 0,26 %) under the current Swedish legislation, presupposing that there are no claims in Sweden. If the new Protocol from the European Commission is adopted in Sweden, the compensation will go up to approximately half a per cent (a calculated 0,56 %), again presupposing that there are no claims in Sweden.

·Consequently, while the Danish government increases its pressure on the Swedish government to decommission Barsebäck’s reactor 2the, at the same time it should negotiate a liability agreement with the Swedish government as quickly as possible that compensates for nuclear damage in Denmark in a realistic way.

Who can be contacted?

For general information on these issues:

Niels Henrik Hooge, BBOFFs contact person in Denmark, tel. +45 46 35 38 79 and +45 21 83 79 94, E-mail: nielshenrik_hooge@yahoo.dk

Roland Rittman, BBOFF’s contact person in Sweden, tel. +4641020748 and +46703968948, E-mail: roland@barseback.org and roland.rittman@swipnet.se

On the comparison between Chernobyl and Barsebäck consequence scenario:

Xavier Coeytaux, Researcher (Chargé d’études), WISE-Paris (www.wise-paris.org) 31-33 rue de la Colonie, 75013 Paris, France, Tel: +33 (0)1 45 65 47 93, Fax: +33 (0)1 45 80 48 58, e-mail: xavier.coeytaux@wise-paris.org

Yves Marignac, Director WISE-Paris, Chief Editor Plutonium Investigation (www.wise-paris.org) 31-33 rue de la Colonie, 75013 Paris, France, Tel: +33 (0)1 45 65 47 93, Fax: +33 (0)1 45 80 48 58, e-mail: yves.marignac@wise-paris.org

On the safety level of the Swedish nuclear power plants:

Fredrik Lundberg, science journalist, tel. +46 (0)8-644 63 44, e-mail: fred.lundberg@telia.com

On the phasing out of nuclear power in Sweden in general and of the Barsebäck nuclear power plant in particular:

Jorma Kahanpää, former chairman of Folkkampanjen mot Kärnkraft-Kärnvapen (FMKK – the Swedish anti-nuclear movement, www.folkkampanjen.se), tel. +46 (0)1 25 510 90 and +46 (0)1 132 68 632, e-mails: jorma.kahanpaa@mp.se and jorma_kahanpaa@hotmail.com

Kjell Andersson, chairman of Folkkampanjen mot Kärnkraft-Kärnvapen (FMKK – the Swedish anti-nuclear movement, www.folkkampanjen.se), tel. +46 (0)8-31, e-mail: kj.andersson@chello.se

What is Barsebäcksoffensiv ?

Barsebäcksoffensiv (BBOFF) is a loosely organized network consisting of activists, green NGO’s and political parties in Denmark, Sweden and Germany.

GREEN NGO’s:

The Danish Ecological Council (www.ecocouncil.dk), contact person: Christian Ege Jørgensen, tel. +45 33 18 19 33, E-mail: christian@ecocouncil.dk

NOAH – Friends of the Earth Denmark (www.noah.dk), contact person: Kim Ejlertsen, tel. +45 35 36 12 12, E-mail: kimejler@post7.tele.dk and kim@noah.dk

The Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature (www.dn.dk), contact person: Allan Andersen, tel. +45 39 17 40 35, E-mail: aa@dn.dk

The Danish Organisation for Renewable Energy (www.orgve.dk), contact person: Ann Vikkelsø, tel. +45 35 37 36 36 and +45 28 88 02 51, E-mail: annv@ove.org

Eco-net (www.eco-net.dk), contact person: Lars Myrthu-Nielsen, tel. +45 62 24 43 24, E-mail: eco-net@eco-net.dk

Nature and Youth (www.natur-og-ungdom.dk), contact person: Søren Mejnert, tel.: (+45) 35 24 56 05 and (mob.) (+45) 26 21 58 99, fax: (+45) 35 24 560, E-mails:smeinert@smeinert.dk and smeinert@wanadoo.dk

Copenhagen’s Environmental and Energy Office (www.kmek.dk), contact person: Ann Vikkelsø, tel. +45 35 37 36 36 and +45 28 88 02, E-mail: kmek@sek.dk

POLITICAL PARTIES:

Enhedslisten, the Danish Red-Green Alliance (www.enhedslisten.dk), contact person: Rikke Fog-Møller, tel. +45 33 37 50 61, E-mail: elrifm@ft.dk and rikkefo@worldonline.dk

BBOFFs contact person in Denmark is Niels Henrik Hooge, tel. +45 46 35 38 79 and +45 21 83 79 94, E-mail: nielshenrik_hooge@yahoo.dk

BBOFF’s contact person in Sweden is Roland Rittman, tel. +4641020748 and +46703968948, E-mail: roland@barseback.org and roland.rittman@swipnet.se

BBOFF’s contact person in Germany is Bernd Frieboese, tel. +49 30 43409598 and +49 163 3139351, E-mail: bernd@barseback.de

For further information on BBOFF, see www.barseback.org, www.bboff.cjb.net and www.barsebacksoffensiv.cjb.net